Forcible dispossession of private property violates human, constitutional rights: SC

New Delhi, April 6: The Supreme Court on Wednesday observed that forcible dispossession of a person of his/her private property violated both human rights and constitutional rights under the Constitution's Article 300-A.

A bench of Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and P.S. Narasimha said: "In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment."

Justice Bhat, who authored the judgment on behalf of the bench, said: "While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A."

The top court judgment came on appeals filed by Sukh Dutt Ratra and Bhagat Ram claiming to be owners of land situated at Mauzal Sarol Basach in Himachal Pradesh's Sirmaur district. The state government utilised the subject land and adjoining lands for the construction of the Narag Fagla Road in 1972-73, but allegedly no land acquisition proceedings were initiated, nor compensation given to the appellants or owners of the adjoining land.

Some others, whose lands were utilised for construction of the same road received enhanced compensation of 30 per cent per annum on the market value of the land, and additional compensation at the rate of 12 percent per annum under Section 23(1-A) of the Act with effect from October 16, 2001.

In 2009, the Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the appeal against this order by those claimants, who were seeking statutory interest from the date of taking possession (rather than date of initiation of acquisition proceedings). A writ petition by some land owners was allowed by the high court with the direction to acquire lands of the writ petitioners under the Act, with consequential benefits, and subsequently other similarly situated owners also received the benefit of these directions.

This led the appellants to file a writ petition before the high court in 2011, seeking compensation for the subject land under the Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Relying on a full bench decision of the high court, it was held that the matter involved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on the starting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in writ proceedings. The writ petition was disposed of, with liberty to file a civil suit in accordance with law. Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals in the top court.

The apex court said that it is not moved by the state government's contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity.

"The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled," it noted.

The bench said that initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the high court. It further added that even after such judicial intervention, the state continued to only extend the benefit of the court's directions to those who specifically approached the courts.

The top court said: "When it comes to the subject of private property, this court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and even more so when done by the state."

Setting aside the high court judgment, it said: "The appellants would also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium, and interest on all sums payable under law w.e.f 16.10.2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act), till the date of the impugned judgment, i.e. 12.09.2013. Given the disregard for the appellants' fundamental rights which has caused them to approach this court and receive remedy decades after the act of dispossession, we also deem it appropriate to direct the Respondent-State to pay legal costs and expenses of Rs 50,000 to the appellants."